DECIMUS SOCIETY
JUST WAR THEORY
BY

SORCHA LAMBKIN

A PAPER PRESENTED TO THE INNER SANCTUM
OF THE DECIMUS SOCIETY

1 FEBRUARY 2002

We as a civilization have a bloody history of war. Some of the most infamous being the First and Second World Wars, and the most recent being the war in Kosavo and the 'war on terrorism'.

(1) 'The question of the rights and wrongs of a particular war is generally considered from a juridical or quasi-juridical standpoint: so and so broke such and such a treaty, crossed such and such a frontier, committed such and such technically unfriendly acts, and therefore by the rules it is permissible to kill as many of his nation as modern armaments render possible. There is a certain unreality, a certain lack of imaginative grasp about this way of viewing matters. It has the advantage, always prized by lazy men, of substituting a formula, at once ambiguous and easily applied for the vital realisation of the consequences of acts.'
Russell, writing in 1915 exposes pathetic reasons for killing such as we still find in warfare today.

So, throughout all the wars of the 20th Century, was one ever fought justly? To answer this we must first define our terms.

(2) 'War': Hostile contention by means of armed forces, carried on between parties in the same nation or state or between nations, states or rulers, the employment of armed forces against a foreign power or against an opposing party in the state.
To define a 'just' war we shall outline the Just War Theory of the title.

But first let us look at the reactions of people subjected to something like the bombings of the twin towers of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon.

After the initial shock and horror at what had happened, the people in government and the ordinary citizens of the United States and nations across the world passed judgement. For most of these people the judgement they passed was that what had happened was a deplorable act of terrorism, claiming innocent lives and destroying the happiness of countless others.

But for some it seemed that America was getting its comeuppance. For example, America's support of Israel in its war against Palestine has enraged Palestinians. America's foreign policy in the Middle East has earned it many enemies, enemies who would see Osama bin Laden's crusade as a just war.

But whatever your own personal views there is a theory that has been developed, which states through various conditions what is and is not a just war.

This theory, known as the Just War Theory evolved through many different countries and cultures, including Islam. Although the theory is not universally accepted, it is recognised widely enough to have credibility as a tool for helping rulers and citizens alike to think clearly about the ethics of war.

The theory is made up of two parts. The first, the right and wrong of getting involved in war, also known as jus ad bellum and the second, the right and wrong of fighting the war, the methods used, jus in bello.

Each of these primary parts of the theory have several secondary components and if any condition is not met then the war is not just. To stress that point every single component must be met for the war to be just.

There are six parts to jus ad bellum (getting involved in war). The first is the Just Cause Principle. This principle says that there must be a good reason for going to war. Obviously this principle is open to interpretation so here are a few examples of what the theory deems to be good reasons. One might be that a nation or group is or has been under attack from an aggressor. Another reason might be that a large number of people are being slaughtered. Still another might be that some catastrophe such as famine has befallen a people and the government in charge is incapable of doing anything about it.

The second condition is the Legitimate Authority Principle which states that for a war to be just it must be entered into by those leaders in government who are authorised to do so and not by a fundamentalist or break-away group.

The third component is the Good Intentions Principle. This operates in accordance with the Just Cause Principle. So, if a nation goes to war in defence of an ally it should not then take advantage of the situation by occupying or exploiting the ally.

The fourth condition is the Likelihood of Success Principle. This states that if there is not a certainty or high probability of winning, a nation should not go to war and thereby needlessly sacrifice military and civilian lives.

The fifth and penultimate principle is that of Proportionality. If the war in question will do more harm than good then it should not be entered into.

The sixth and last principle is that of Last Resort. Every other means of settling the dispute should be attempted before a nation goes to war.

The second part of the Just War Theory, jus in bello has just two principles. The first is Proportionality again but instead of being applied to the query of whether or not to go to war, this deals with the methods employed in fighting. So if commanders or soldiers are contemplating the kind of kamikaze attacks which were displayed amongst the Japanese in the Second World War, they would have to decide whether their lives were worth more or less than the outcome that they would hope to achieve with their deaths, for the war to remain just.

The second principle of jus in bello is that of Discrimination. By this I mean that forces must aim to hit military and strategic targets, e.g. airports and military supply trains, rather than hospitals or schools.

Again it must be stressed that every principle must be satisfied for the war to remain just.

The two parts, jus ad bellum and jus in bello must be judged separately.

Now, if we use this theory with an event very recent and therefore vivid in our minds, the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, then it is not difficult to prove that neither the attacks nor the retaliation can be defined as just wars. Let us go through the theory step by step using the terrorist attacks and the US' 'war on terrorism'.

The first principle of jus ad bellum is the Just Cause Principle. Both sides feel that they have a just cause, that is without doubt. The men under the command of bin Laden feel betrayed by America after the US withdrew its support from Afghanistan's fight against Russia, because the political situation was no longer in America's favour. And America feels that it has a just cause because it was attacked without warning and thousands of lives were lost.

The second principle, the Legitimate Authority Principle, is one that is ambiguous again. At first glance it would appear that the terrorists fail because bin Laden (assuming that he is guilty of master-minding the hijackings) is no political authority, and yet he seems to have been supported by the Taliban who were the political authorities. So was/is he just a scapegoat for powerful Afghan politicians?

America certainly does not fail this principle since all the high political powers are involved in this war.

The Good Intentions Principle does not seem to have been fulfilled by either side. The Taliban have been shown to be ruthless to both friend and foe, as have the Americans, who seem to have merely used the Northern Alliance to depose the Taliban without any intentions of granting them control of Afghanistan.

The fourth principle, that of the Likelihood of Success is not fulfilled by either side. The men of bin Laden cannot possibly hope to defeat the world's only superpower, maim it maybe but never destroy it. And as for America, how can you possibly fight a war against terrorism? To defeat Afghanistan and the al-Qaida network yes, but to achieve their overall objective would be to find and destroy all terrorist organisations across the globe, an absurd proposition.

Proportionality, well again the terrorists fail this one. The principle states that if war should do more harm than good then it should not be entered into. Well what boost to their cause did they think blowing up three buildings full of civilians would achieve?

America passes this one since to destroy a terrorist organisation would certainly bring more good than harm but then of course it depends on the methods in use.

Finally, the Last Resort Principle. Both sides fail this one. The terrorists, from as little we know, did not try to sort out their grievances with America in a non-violent way. They just hijacked four planes and flew them into three buildings full of people. However, America did not try much before they declared war either. Yes they did ask for bin Laden to be handed over and declared war as a consequence of not doing so but that was all. I am sure that there were many alternative bargaining practices to be deployed other than the ultimatum the US gave the Taliban. However, because America had been attacked on its own soil, with many civilian casualties, the government had to be seen by the people of America to be taking a tough stance with the supposed perpetrators, and the Last Resort Principle had to be sacrificed in favour of public relations.

And now the jus in bello part to the theory. Proportionality. The terrorists passed this one. They sacrificed a few of their own lives to kill thousands of what they see as the enemy. So in their eyes the hijacking was very successful.

America passes this one too. By bombing an almost defenceless country they have lost no lives and yet have killed thousands of what they see to be the enemy.

And Discrimination. The hijackers fail this one since on two occasions out of three they hit civilian targets. The attack on the Pentagon, although no less horrible was somehow less deplorable since it was a military target.

America seems to have failed this condition too, although they would deny it. Although US forces aimed at military and strategic targets, rumours and statements made by the Afghan authorities claim that US bombers have hit hospitals and schools, one would hope by accident. But since none of these reports can or have been verified we must take the failing of this condition to be ambiguous.

So, is either of these wars just? Each condition had to be met for them to be considered so, and since both sides failed several principles it is clear that neither is fighting a just war.

But can a just war really be fought? I think not. One would find it impossible to locate any war in history that fulfils every condition of the Just War Theory.

However despicable war may be, I cannot see a world where it does not occur. Wherever there are humans in large numbers there will be war.

And to make these wars as just as possible it is necessary that the armed forces attract recruits who are intelligent and moral so that the conditions of the Just War Theory are followed as closely as is feasible.

ADDENDA
Military Incompetence
So, even though we have dismissed the possibility of ever fighting a just war, even if we were able to do so we would still have the problem of military incompetence occurring. In every war there have been cases of military incompetence. Some obvious examples would be the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and the events leading up to Dunkirk.

But why do cases of military incompetence occur? Is it due to stupid (low intelligence) generals and commanders? Surely if this were the case then we would expect to find a random miscellany of errors running through the history of wars. Yet this is not the case.

The following summary of frequently occurring mistakes suggests a common pattern of errors:

(3) 1. A serious wastage of human resources and failure to observe one of the first principles of war Ð economy of force.

Ê2. A fundamental conservatism and clinging to outworn tradition with an inability to profit from past experience.

Ê3. A tendency to reject or ignore information which is contrary with preconceptions.

Ê4. A tendency to underestimate the enemy and overestimate the capabilities of one's own side.

Ê5. Indecisiveness and a tendency to abdicate from the role of decision maker.

Ê6. An obstinate persistence in a given task despite contrary evidence.

Ê7. A failure to exploit a situation gained and a tendency to 'pull punches' rather than push home an attack.

Ê8. A failure to make adequate reconnaissance.

Ê9. A predilection for frontal assaults often against the enemy's strongest point.

10. A belief in brute force rather than the clever ruse.

11. A failure to make use of surprise or deception.

12. An undue readiness to find scapegoats for military setbacks.

13. A suppression or distortion of news from the front usually rationalised as necessary for morale or security.

14. A belief in mystical forces Ð fate, bad luck etc.

So it seems that even if a just war could be fought the human element could always make the war a failure.

The simple solution to this problem? Avoid war as much as is possible.


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The Military Mind
So what makes a person want to join the armed forces, lead soldiers into battle, and ultimately kill other human beings? What makes up the military mind?

Statistics show that whether they volunteer or are conscripted, very few members of the armed forces of any nation are found to lack the qualities needed to be at least an adequate member of an armed force.

Thus virtually any mind is more or less 'military' on the lower level.

A military mind on the higher level, e.g. Generals, commanders etc. needs to be organised, have the ability to induce co-operation, work well under great pressure and be competitive.


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NOTES

(1) Bertrand Russell: The Ethics of War, International Journal of Ethics 1915.
(2) Shorter Oxford English Dictionary
(3) The Oxford Companion to the Mind - Military Incompetence

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bertrand Russell - 'The Ethics of War', International Journal of Ethics 1915
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary
The Oxford Companion to the Mind

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